



**Director of  
Central  
Intelligence**

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**LEBANON-IRAN: Attack on US Embassy**

*The Islamic Struggle Organization, which claimed responsibility for the bombing yesterday of the US Embassy in Beirut, is probably an Iranian-supported Lebanese Shia group.* [redacted]

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The Struggle Organization has claimed responsibility for the attack last month on the US Marines assigned to the multinational peacekeeping force. It also says it carried out at least one other attack against the French contingent of the multinational force this month.

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Disrupting the situation in Lebanon by bombing the Embassy would further Iran's foreign policy objective of exporting the Islamic Revolution but would undercut its attempts to improve its international image. Radical elements within the regime may have sponsored the act without official sanction. [redacted]

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
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**CHINA-VIETNAM: Military and Political Pressure**

*The Chinese artillery fire that began last weekend and naval actions against Vietnam are intended to warn Hanoi to stop its attacks against Kampuchean resistance groups and to cease its incursions into Thailand.* [ ]

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**Comment:** China [ ] is responding to Vietnam's current offensive against Kampuchean resistance forces along the Thai-Kampuchean border. Beijing also is using the occasion to criticize the Soviets for supporting Vietnam, underscoring an important obstacle to the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations. [ ]

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The Chinese have enough forces near the border to send patrols into Vietnam, but there is little likelihood of another invasion of Vietnam similar to the one in 1979. There are no signs of a Chinese military buildup or of other preparations for a more ambitious operation. [ ]

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Hanoi's military deployments in the north over the past four years give Vietnam a nearly two-to-one advantage over China in troops near the border. China also is likely to be restrained by its interest in improving relations with the USSR. [ ]

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The Soviets apparently are concerned that the surge in fighting along the Thai-Kampuchean border and the growing tension between China and Vietnam could obstruct their developing dialogue with the Chinese. Beijing cites Soviet support for Vietnam's policy on Kampuchea as a major obstacle to improved bilateral ties. [ ]

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Foreign Minister Gromyko called an unusual meeting in Moscow on Saturday with Ambassadors of the three Indochinese countries to call for a settlement on Kampuchea between Hanoi and ASEAN. The move clearly is calculated to portray Moscow as a peacemaker in the area. [ ]

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**USSR-EL SALVADOR: Soviet Views**

*The USSR apparently is not optimistic about the insurgents' immediate prospects in El Salvador but believes they could succeed over the long term.*

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**Comment:** Since 1981, Moscow has appeared less sanguine about the insurgents' short-term military prospects. Nevertheless, the Soviets may calculate the lengthy military stalemate will further complicate the US administration's efforts to win Congressional and public support for its Central American policy. If the US decides eventually to put pressure on San Salvador to negotiate with the insurgents, the Soviets probably hope the party will be able to exploit any government overtures.

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**NIGERIA-US: Possible Demonstrations**

*The US Embassy has taken security precautions in anticipation that the leading opposition party may incite anti-US demonstrations in Lagos this week.* [ ]

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The Nigerian press continues to play up anti-US stories that appeared last week in two newspapers controlled by the southern, Yoruba-based Unity Party. The stories allege the discovery of a CIA plot to assassinate party leader Awolowo. They are based on a purported US Embassy document that the Ambassador believes may have been forged with Soviet or East European assistance. [ ]

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Several opposition leaders and the student union of the predominantly Yoruba University of Ibadan have called for the expulsion of the Ambassador and the reduction of the Embassy staff. The government has increased police protection around the Embassy and announced an investigation. [ ]

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**Comment:** Many Nigerians are taking the allegations seriously. The attacks coincide with signs that Unity Party prospects for presidential elections this August appear increasingly dim. [ ]

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Radicals in the party, who believe Washington is in league with President Shagari's conservative, northern-oriented ruling party, evidently are responsible for the anti-US campaign. They may be seeking to blame the US for any election violence initiated by the Unity Party. [ ]

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**FRANCE: Communist Party Meeting**

*The Central Committee of the French Communist Party meets today and tomorrow to assess results of municipal elections last month and to debate the government's new austerity measures.* [REDACTED]

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**Comment:** The Central Committee probably will criticize important aspects of the government's austerity measures but endorse continued participation in the government as necessary to limit the measures' impact on workers. The government's refusal last week to grant any significant concessions to the Communists regarding the austerity program indicates the Communists' leverage will continue to be seriously limited. [REDACTED]

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Nonetheless, opposition in the party to remaining in the government appears to be growing. Communist discontent over the austerity measures probably is the principal cause for this development. President Mitterrand's firm stand on East-West political and security issues also is likely to have contributed to resentment over Socialist policies among both senior Communist officials and rank-and-file activists. [REDACTED]

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**USSR: Speech by Andropov**

Soviet media yesterday reported on a conference on agriculture attended by all members of the top leadership except Party Secretary Chernenko. Politburo member Gorbachev delivered the main report, but media attention was focused on General Secretary Andropov's concluding remarks. Andropov exhorted agriculture officials to organize their work better but offered no new policies. Meanwhile, Soviet and East German officials have been telling US diplomats that Chernenko did not lead the delegation to the Karl Marx celebrations in Berlin last week because he suddenly became ill. [redacted]

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**Comment:** The conference is unusual in that virtually all of the republic and regional party leaders attended it. In this forum, Andropov addressed a key policy matter with the apparent backing of the entire remainder of the Politburo and Secretariat. [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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### Vides Casanova



44 years old . . . was director of National Guard . . . generally respected and skilled in dealing with people . . . choice of most senior civilian and military officials to replace Garcia . . . will probably not play as dominant a role as Garcia . . . deeply religious . . . speaks some English . . . first wife died; has remarried . . . four children.

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**EL SALVADOR: New Defense Minister**

The resignation of General Garcia as Defense Minister, effective yesterday, and his replacement by former National Guard Commander General Vides Casanova are likely to lead to major changes in the military high command. Vides has already indicated his plans to replace the Vice Minister of Defense and the Army Chief of staff, and his nomination has been submitted to the Constituent Assembly for ratification. [ ]

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**Comment:** The war effort has been hindered by Garcia's retention of incompetent field commanders on the basis of their personal loyalty. Vides may want to appoint more aggressive officers. He especially may want to designate a strong critic of Garcia, such as Air Force Commander Colonel Bustillo or First Brigade Commander Blandon, as chief of staff. [ ]

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**NETHERLANDS: Difficulties Over INF**

An official at NATO suggested the Netherlands is considering delaying its decision on INF until after September, when the Dutch 10-year defense study is scheduled for publication. The study is to include discussion of all phases of future Dutch defense, both conventional and nuclear. Some leaders in The Hague are concerned that presentation of a nuclear section in the study might lead to a parliamentary debate that would result in defeat for INF, but Prime Minister Lubbers reportedly remains firm on including the section. Lubbers's Christian Democrats are badly divided over INF, and groups opposed to deployment plan to time their demonstrations to coincide with the debate of the defense study in parliament. [ ]

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**Comment:** Many Dutch politicians probably hope progress in INF negotiations will help avoid the need for deployment in the Netherlands. They also are likely to hope that, if this does not happen and deployment proceeds on schedule in the UK and West Germany in December, opposition in the Netherlands will be weakened. [ ]

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**GUATEMALA: Controversy Over Economic Policy**

Government officials, goaded by the private sector, have reluctantly announced measures to ease economic difficulties, but they still probably will not be enough to overcome the severe shortage of foreign exchange. The Minister of Finance says that negotiations are in progress with the IMF for a \$125 million standby loan and that a value-added tax will be imposed and larger budget cuts made.

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**Comment:** Current foreign exchange reserves can barely cover imports for another two weeks, and industry could be virtually paralyzed within a few months. The new steps are unlikely to mute mounting criticism from influential businessmen, who fault the government for not taking these actions sooner. Leaders of the private sector believe stronger and faster action is needed to ease the country's financial difficulties. Businessmen also resent the government's failure to consult with them and are likely to push harder for direct participation by the private sector in making economic policy.

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## **Special Analysis**

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### **JORDAN: The King's Next Moves**

*King Hussein intends to keep a dialogue with the PLO alive, despite the Jordanian cabinet's statement last week. He reportedly will not meet with high-level PLO officials, however, unless they have something new to say. In the meantime, Jordan will stress the plight of West Bank Palestinians in an effort to force the PLO to give priority to the recovery of Arab land rather than its own survival.*

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The popular reaction in Jordan to a renewal of the dialogue with the PLO probably will be mixed. Earlier, both East Bank and Palestinian Jordanians appeared to be behind the King's efforts to move forward in the peace process. Now, however, the two groups disagree about what steps should be taken next.

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As a result of the PLO's rejection of Hussein's proposals, East Bankers have hardened their attitudes toward the PLO and Palestinians in general and believe the King has done all that he can for the PLO. They now believe he should focus on Jordan's long-term national security interests, which they see as linked to progress in the peace process.

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The Palestinian community in Jordan is divided over the PLO's future role. The basic split is over the goal of the Palestinian national movement—the drive for an independent Palestinian state or the acceptance of something less.

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Many Palestinians still maintain strong support for the PLO leadership, while others have joined East Bankers in condemning the organization and PLO leader Arafat. The US Embassy in Amman reports that those who are disgruntled seem increasingly receptive to an alternative Palestinian leadership, provided it shows it can deliver on a settlement.

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### **Near-Term Strategy**

Amman seems to believe the best way to force Arafat and PLO moderates to come to terms with it is to focus attention on the increasing problems faced by the Palestinians under Israeli occupation and the ineffectiveness of PLO rhetoric in curbing Israeli settlement activity. The Jordanians probably also hope their hints of

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closing the bridges linking Jordan and the West Bank or dismantling the network of institutions that have maintained West Bank ties to Jordan will put Palestinian pressure on the PLO. [ ]

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In addition, Hussein may try to take advantage of fresh doubts about Arafat's leadership by encouraging West Bank leaders to establish an alternative leadership that could join him in peace negotiations. The King, however, is unlikely to have any real success with the West Bank leaders. They have never had enough political influence to take a stand independent of the PLO. [ ]

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### **Counting on Washington**

In any event, the King will be looking to the US to provide the support and guarantees needed to convince the PLO—or, if necessary, the West Bankers—that he can deliver on a settlement favorable to the Palestinians' interests. Without that, there is little he can do. Hussein will not enter negotiations alone. [ ]

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